MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

V SEMESTER

(2019 Admission)

B A PHILOSOPHY

Core Course

PHL5 B08

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PHL5B08- Modern Western Philosophy

90Hrs.5/Weeks  Total Credits 4

Module I- Characteristics of Modern Western Philosophy

Module II- Rationalism- Descartes- Spinoza- Leibenitz

Module III- Empiricism- John Locke- George Berkeley- David Hume

Module IV- Immanuel Kant –Hegel- Karl Marx
Module I
Characteristics of Modern Philosophy

Introduction

The word ‘philosophy’ consist of two Greek words namely ‘philos’ and ‘sophia’. The etymological meaning of the term is ‘the friendship or love of wisdom’. As such a philosopher may be called a ‘wise man’. Socrates defined a philosopher is ‘a seeker after wisdom’. So the philosophy seeks wisdom, and not knowledge.

For our convenience western philosophy divided the continues river of thought into four periods.

1. Ancient Philosophy:- Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle, Greco-Roman philosophy, Neo-Platonism of the Alexandrian School.
2. Medieval philosophy or Scholasticism from the fifth to the fifteenth century
3. Modern Philosophy:- Renaissance from the 15th to the 17th century, the period of enlightenment from Locke to Kant, German Philosophy from Kant to Hegel
4. Contemporary philosophy from 1860 to the present times.

Characteristics of Modern Philosophy: Medieval philosophy remained wedded to theology. In contrast, modern philosophy arose in the wake of science and remained subservient to scientific methodology. Modern philosophy developed three important ideas, namely, philosophical method, formation of philosophical systems and humanism. In contrast, contemporary philosophy may be said to begin with anti metaphysical tendencies due to excessive preoccupation with linguistic analysis. Contemporary philosophy is also suspicious of system building.

The spirit of modern philosophy is critical of the past. Bacon begins with an attack on Aristotelian Deduction and process to give a Novam Organum for the real progress of
knowledge. Descartes also disparages the old philosophy and advises us to begin *de novo* for a sounder metaphysics. This revolt is not only confined to Bacon and Descartes but Locke and Kant are equally conscious of a need for new method in philosophy.

The aggressiveness and individualism were the result of recapturing of faith in human capacity of known all things. Nothing could escape from the liberation of reason.

Scholars of medieval thought from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present have employed the term ‘scholasticism’ in various senses: some have extended the term to make it practically equivalent to ‘medieval philosophy’, n the 13 th Century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) brought the inheritance of earlier centuries’ Roman Catholic philosophy to a comprehensive completion. Right up to the present time Roman Catholicism accepts the basic structure of his thinking as its official standpoint (cf. the encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, namely “Rerum Novarum” (1891) and “Quadragesimo Anno” (1931) respectively). Thomas’ “synthesis-thinking” grew out of his effort to throw a bridge between the Greek understanding of nature (Aristotle’s, to be precise) and the Scriptural teaching of the creation of the cosmos. That Greek conception was governed, in whole and in part, by the dualistic form-matter scheme of Greek paganism, radically opposed to Scripture’s creation-motif. In the form-matter scheme there is actually no room for creation, merely the recognition of an amorphous, chaotic matter that, by a (divine) forming activity, achieves a coherence of form and matter. The Greek concept of substance is associated directly with this; in it, temporal reality is divided into sensory and supra-sensory realms (the phenomenon and the noumenon). The “nature” of things must lie behind their visible changing and becoming, since it always remains possible amidst their flux and alteration to make a judgment of identity (e.g. a tree remains tree in both its winter and summer appearance). In this manner, the “nature” or “substance” of things is shifted to the supra-sensory realm of our experience, where the authentic “being” of existing things is concentrated.
Module II
Rationalism

Introduction

According to rationalism intellect is an independent source of knowledge. This gives us innate or 
*a priori* ideas. Knowledge is consists of these innate ideas alone. The self-evident universal 
truths are given by our intellect, the best example of which is found in mathematics for e.g. ‘two 
and two are together equal to four’. The extreme form of rationalism denies the part which sense-
experience plays in the formation of knowledge. Generally rationalism does give a subordinate 
place to sense-experience. Therefore, according to it, experience does not constitute but serves an 
occurasion for the exercise of intellect, whose innate ideas constitute knowledge.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650)

He is a French philosopher, was born in Touraine in 1596. Throughout his life he remained a 
bachelor and his inheritance enabled him to dedicate himself to philosophical meditation. Apart 
from being an epoch-making philosopher and He was creative mathematician. He is also known 
as the ‘father of modern philosophy’. Descartes has been real initiator of modern rationalism. 
First, as mentioned before he laid down that reason is the sole arbiter of philosophical dispute. 
He is the founder of rationalism in its distinguishing feature by pointing out that real, universal 
and necessary knowledge is found in innate ideas alone.

Descartes Method:- Descrate was very much worried by the uncertain state of philosophy in his 
times. He saw that philosophy was cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that had ever 
lived and there was yet not a single proposition in it which was not under dispute.
**Innate ideas:** it is no amount of sense-experience can give us universal knowledge for necessary the former is particular. As such the universal principle is supplied by the mind to the sense data. Now divested of the inadequate and mediaeval expression, the doctrine of innate ideas really means that mind is not totally respective but is also active. It supplies the active formative principles of knowledge. In this broad and sympathetic interpretation of innate ideas, Descartes seems to be essentially correct. Descartes has been recognized the dual role of innate ideas. They are

1. Since the essence of the mind is consciousness or thought so there are certain ideas which belong to the mind alone. specially the innate ideas are characterized by clearness and distinctness. In this sense innate ideas meant pure and abstract thoughts.

2. However, Descartes was also obliged to extend the innateness to sense ideas as well. First, he could not find their place in the mental series as they seemed to be caused by something external to the mind. But afterwards, he had to yield. The sense experience of color, taste etc. are not in objects and therefore they belongs to the physical existence. The external stimulus at most serves the function of release mechanism, exciting the sense- organs and consequently through the pineal gland the soul to form sense-experience. Accordingly, Descartes had to concede even though reluctantly that the ideas of sense must be natural to the mind. i.e innate. Upon the second view, then instead of the innate ideas forming a special class, innateness becomes characteristic of every idea.

Doctrine of innate idea was suggestive of future development in the modern stream thought. There is yet another element in the Cartesian rationalism of modern development. This element consists in showing that certain knowledge is found in the analysis of consciousness.

**Cogito Ergo Sum:**- This *cogito ergo sum* is the final certainty and as such we have to be careful in its interpretation as well as in deciding its position in the Cartesian Philosophy. Descartes tried to establish is not an inference, but a simple fact of primitive knowledge or self- evident axiom. Had it been an inference, then it would be merely dependent on premises for its certainty and then again these premises on other premises for their certainty. This would lead to infinite regress without reaching the indubitable truth. However, the certainty of the *cogito* is clear and distinct, and, that nothing else could be perceived or intuited with the same certainty. *Cogito Ergo Sum* means that my consciousness is the means of revealing myself as something existiong. Here is the indubitable truth of the inseparability of thought and thing. My being implied in my
being conscious is the first principle both logically and psychologically. Of course the use of the term ‘therefore’ was unfortunate for it led to the interpretation of the cogito as an inference. However ‘therefore’ primarily means a step in inference but secondarily it means a relation of necessary connection. Descartes uses the term therefore in the secondary sense.

The metaphor is ‘I think therefore I am’ should not be emphasized to hold that thinking alone guarantees self-existence. The important thing is to show that it is my consciousness which carries with it the existence of myself. No other function apart from conscious can guarantee the existence of the self. There for it would be wrong to say because ‘I walk there for I am’, for walking with ought being conscious cannot imply self-existence.

**Existence of God:** the ideas are either innate or those of Being who is ‘eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, source of all goodness and truth, creator of all things and in sum having in himself all those things in which we can clearly note some perfection which is infinite, or limited by no imperfection. The idea must have been caused by an equally perfect cause, namely, the infinitely perfect being called God.

The causal proof of the existence of God is based on two assumptions, namely

1) Individual consciousness knows itself to be finite, and 2) this consciousness of ‘God’ is derived only from the conception of an absolutely perfect being. Of course, some may object that the infinite being may be a negative idea, i.e., that which is not finite. Now Descartes points out that the idea of the infinite being is the most positive idea for in comparison with the fullness of the Perfect Being we realize our finitude.

**Ontological Proof:** Descartes add the causal proof is the cosmological proof for the existence of God. It can be proved only with the help of the idea of a Perfect Being who has created everything else in the world. But the most important proof of the existence is God is **Ontological.** According to this, the existence of God follows from the very idea of the perfect being just as the equality of 3 angles of a triangle=2 right angles follows from the very idea of a triangle. The most perfect being cannot be thought without at the same time thinking of Him as actually existing. Of course, the idea and the actual finite thing are not inseparable. One can think of a winged horse though there may be none in reality. But this idea is perfect being, according to Descartes, cannot be thought apart from His existence.

Descartes has been accused of copying Anselm’s proof of the existence of God which runs thus: ‘consideration demonstrates the word God to mean that which must be thought as
what is greatest; but to be an actually as well as in thought, is greater than to be in thought alone; therefore, God exist not only in thought, but in fact idea of a perfect being. This proof’s make God’s existence dependent on the thought of it. God exist, because we think of a perfect idea, namely, God. Descartes points out that his proof is different from that of Anselm for Descartes points out that his proof is different from that of Anselm for Descartes makes the thought of God depend on His Being. ‘whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the true and unalterable nature of anything, to its essence, its form, that may be predicated of it. Now we find, on investigating God, that existence belongs to his true and unalterable nature, and therefore, we may legitimately predicate existence of God.

Mid- Body problem:- the method of Descartes in reaching *Cogito ergo sum* is one of abstraction. One by one he takes all that is not essential in thinking and discards them till he comes to consciousness. Now in order to know consciousness one need not refer to extension. Similarly, in knowing extension one need not refer to consciousness. Consciousness and extension, Mind and Body, then are independent of one another and do not involve each other's existence. As such there are two independent substances called mind and body.

Thus dualism of mind and body is important, for human beings have both body and soul. The human body like all other organic bodies is a mere machine. The moving principle of this machine is the heat in the heart. The death is due to the destruction of some important parts of the body machine. In human beings alone God by a special creation adds soul. There can be no real relation between body and soul for they are diametrically opposed. The relation of the soul to the body is of the nature of the pilot to his machine.

The vague formulation of the mind and body relationship is very inadequate. We intuitively know that there is some relation between mind and body, we must decide the precise nature of it. Descartes wavers between interactions which he seems to suggest and parallelism which follows logically from his absolute dualism. A great many bodily activities can be explained in terms of reflexes and his acute observation in this connection makes him the precursor of modern behaviorism. But bodily activities are to some extent influenced by the mind, and the mind is also influenced by the body. Descartes believes that there are real material bodies. This general belief in material bodies is based on divine veracity. If want to know definitely about the particular material bodies, then we can know only their primary qualities but
the so-called secondary non-quantitative qualities are nothing but confused ideas. The confused ideas, however, are caused by external objects as is clear from his explanation of perception. In perception the material bodies effect the mental states through the human body.

**Firstly**, exciting body affects the sense- organs of the percipient’s own body

**Secondly**, this bodily affection moves the subtle animal spirit in the nerves. The movement of the animal spirits terminates in the pineal gland which he considers to be seat of the soul. The soul is indivisible substance and therefore occupies the pineal gland which is the only undivided portion of the brain

**Finally**, a physical impress or seal is left on the pineal gland which serves as the occasion of the origin of consciousness.

Descartes seems to have explained away the mechanical pressure of the body on the mind by the mediating services of the animal spirits terminating in the pineal gland. Similarly, the mind acts on the body by moving the animal spirits in the pineal gland which coursing through the muscles leads to bodily movement. This direct interactionism he tries to conceal with the help of the analogy of the rider and the horse. Just as the rider spurs on the horse to run fast with his own energy, so the mind only excites the bodily movement without imparting its own energy into the material series.

**Spinoza**

**Doctrine of Substance**

According to Spinoza all our objects of knowledge fall into any of the three categories of substance, attribute and modes. Here going to mentioned about substance. Spinoza had the vision of the unity of all things. As such he starts with something from which everything can be shown to follow necessarily. This something is calls substances in Descartes view of called mind and body dependent substances on God but Spinoza points out that the phrase ‘dependant substances’ is contradiction in terms a substance cannot depend on anything else. Spinoza tells us that substance can be understood only by referring to itself. He points out that every determination is negation. Hence his substance becomes most positive without any limitation. The actual table is not real for it is finite. It is finite for it is limited on all sides by other bodies. Its pure reality is reached when all qualities of colour, weight and so on are abstracted from it. Hence, the
substance can only be negatively described. Here the popular maxim of Spinoza is every determination is negation.

In Spinoza defined by substance has that it cannot but be infinite, since if it were finite it would mean that it is limited by something else. However, the substance is self-determined and self-contained and nothing can affect or modify it. He also calls it *causa sui*. To begin with ‘cause’ means for us an invariable relation between two successive events. Spinoza is not using the term of temporal connections at all. He is trying to find out non-temporal rational connection. A cause according to him, explains phenomena and does not simply describe them.

**Doctrine of Modes:** Spinoza’s doctrine of modes was the world of finite and individual thing. According to him the finite modes can never be derived from the substance and attributes. He says that “only the infinite can follow from the infinite, the finite can follow only form the finite”. The modes are individual things of finite experience. They are to the substance what the waves are to the sea, shapes that perpetually die away that never are. They can never exist without the substance though the substance can exist without them. Modes are said to be actual in so far as they exist at a certain time and place. Viewed in this way they do not follow form the in terminable series or connection of finite things. But modes are said to be real when we conceive them under the form of eternity. As such they are to be viewed as they are in God. Sometimes Spinoza regards the modes to be real affections actually existing in God and sometimes looks upon them as mere illusions created by abstract imagination which views things as separated and unrelated.

**Psycho-physical parallelism:** Spinoza’s view of human mind as ‘the idea of the body’ and then again ‘the idea of the idea’. The idea of the body represents the parallelism of Spinoza. Thought and extension run parallel and the order and the system of one corresponds to the order and system of the other. The actual circle must correspond to the idea of a circle. The same way the actual body must have, in the corresponding series, the idea of the body or the mind. Parallelism excludes possibility of both materialism and idealism. Matter cannot be caused by the mind, nor can mind be reduced to matter. Both are independent series and yet one and the same thing is both.

Secondly the idea of the body means that thought is never empty. It has always some object. A knowledge is always a definite knowledge of definite things. As things are found in a series, so corresponding to them there are ideal series. He does not seem to believe in permanent
self which survives body for there can be no self without a corresponding body. The concept of idea means the mental correlate of a certain modification of the body and then again it may mean the concept or general impression of that modification.

Libenitz:- we observe that visible bodies, the objects of the senses, are divisible: that is to say, they are aggregates or compounds. This means that bodies are composed of simple substances, without parts. ‘There must be simple substances, since there are compound substances, for the compound is only a collection or aggregatum of simple substances’. These simple substances, of which all empirical things are composed, are called by Leibniz ‘monads’. They are ‘the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things’. The use of the word ‘atom’ must not be taken to mean that the Leibnizian monad resembles the atoms of Democritus or Epicurus. The monad, being without parts, does not possess extension, figure or divisibility. A thing cannot possess figure or shape unless it is extended; nor can it be divisible unless it possesses extension. But a simple thing cannot be extended; for simplicity and extension are incompatible. This means that monads cannot come into existence in any other way than by creation. Nor can they perish in any other way than by annihilation. Compound substances can, of course, come into existence and perish by aggregation and dissolution of monads; but the latter, being simple, do not admit of these processes. In this respect there is, indeed, a certain resemblance between monads and the atoms of the philosophers; but the atoms of Epicurus possessed shape, even though they were asserted to be indivisible. Moreover, whereas the atomists first conceived atoms and then interpreted the soul in terms of the atomic theory, as composed of smoother, rounder and finer atoms, Leibniz may have been said to have conceived the monad on an analogy with the soul. For each is in some sense a spiritual substance.

Leibniz decided that these substantial units are distinguished from one another by the degree of ‘perception’ and ‘appetite’ which each possesses. He frequently called them ‘souls’, therefore, though in order to be able to distinguish between souls in the ordinary sense and other substantial units he came to employ the word ‘monad’ as a general term. ‘Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity or that which is one’.

It is necessary to introduce here a point which is of the greatest importance for an understanding of Leibniz’s theory of monads. Each substance or monad is the principle and source of its activities: it is not inert but has an inner tendency to activity and self-development. Force, energy, activity are of the essence of substance. ‘The idea of energy or virtue, called by the
Germans Kraft and by the French la force, and for the explanation of which I have designed a special science of dynamics, adds much to the understanding of the notion of substance.' Indeed, substance can be defined as 'being, capable of action. Substance is no simply activity itself: activity is the activity of a substance. This means that there is in the monad a principle of activity or a primitive force, which can be distinguished from the actual successive activities of the monad.

**Pre established Harmony**

Leibniz' s notion of pre-established harmony. Leibniz denies causal relations involving necessary connections between phenomena or between the monads; he replaces these with pre-established harmony and causal laws with functional relationships; in science we are simply concerned with the determinate way one phenomenon varies in relation to another. It is the se functional relations that constitute laws of nature, not some mysterious further notion of necessary connection. Just as the existence of any monad is always contingent, and there is an infinity of possible worlds, so there is an infinity of possible laws or orders of nature. The only true causes, apart from God, in the sense of producing deductive explanations, are the states of the monads derived from within each monad itself. Each monad is completely self-contained, but in a more or less confused way every monad mirrors the entire universe. The mirroring of the universe gives each monad a unique point of view; these constitute active states of the monads which are "perceptions "; the tendency to change between these perceptions is termed "apperception". The spontaneity of changing states of the monads reflects Leibniz' s concern for dynamics; that an essential property of substance must be force or activity, contrary to the inert extended matter of Descartes. The monads have "no windows" through which anything can come in or go out; monads are substances and there can be no interaction between substances. God's initial choice of what set of monads to create arranges things so that the subsequent states of the monad s are perfectly coordinated or harmonized in accordance with certain laws. This is analogous to two clocks being set at the same time: the y always strike correctly together at twelve o'clock and at all other times on the hour even though they do not interact. God, in choosing this world, arranges a perfect coordination of all its monadic elements.

Each monad has within it an active force whereby its states unfold. This harmonious coordination of the monads involves a mirroring by each monad of the states of all the other monads, which means that a change in any on e monad would entail a completely different
universe, for adjustments would have to be made in the systemic thematic arrangement everywhere else. The universe is a plenum; the plenum of space corresponds to the infinitesimal qualitative differences between The world as it appears to us in space and time is a set of "well founded phenomena" rather than a mere illusion; that is, the world of the possible, pure essences that are not actualized. There must, however, be a sufficient reason for what God chooses if the universe is to be fully rationally explicable; the reason why God chooses to actualize some contingent possibilities rather than others cannot be found in the principle of non-contradiction, since their non actualization would not imply a contradiction; the sufficient reason is derived from the goodness of God, which means that, from an infinity of possible worlds, He chooses the best of all possible worlds; a world of maximum plenitude or variety tempered with greatest order or simplicity of explanation.

**Empiricism**

Empiricists hold that all the material knowledge like our ideas or concepts, actual matters of fact, opposed to logical or conceptual truths all these must be derived from or it reduced to aspects of our experience. These features of the information are provided by the content of our senses and introspection. Empiricists deny that it is possible to know by reason alone the nature of what exists; rather, the nature of what exists can be known only through experience. We should reject as meaningless ideas or concepts which cannot be specified as corresponding to any possible experiences. We should reject knowledge claims concerning matters of fact about the nature of the world which are not supportable by the evidence of experience. This leads to a tendency among empiricists to emphasize that the limit of human knowledge and imagination is bounded by the limit of our experience. Empiricists reject the rationalist claim that it is possible to come to know by *a priori* reason alone the nature of an intelligible real world inaccessible to experience that stands beyond appearances. The important three empiricist thinkers are John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume.

**John Locke (1632-1704)**

He was born in Wrington in Somerset and died at Oates in Essex. Locke was far from being the caricature of the philosophical recluse; he was, on the contrary, a man well known in public affairs, sometimes involving considerable danger; but, despite his close involvement with controversial political affairs, Locke was a prudent man. He taught Greek and moral philosophy,
but soon became interested in medicine, and attained the BM (Bachelor of Medicine) degree from the University of Oxford in 1674. It was during his time at Oxford that Locke became dissatisfied with the philosophy of scholasticism and first became acquainted with, and derived inspiration from, the works of Descartes.

Ideas:- Locke tries to determine the nature, function and origin and limit of knowledge. He defined it as the perception of the connection or repugnance of ideas. Hence the use of the term idea is very important both for understanding his philosophy and that of his successors Berkeley and Hume. The idea has two distinct meanings. 1) It may mean a mode of individual consciousness. As such it becomes a subjective modification without any necessary reference to objective things. 2) an idea may mean a representation of something other than itself.

Refutation of Innate Ideas:-

In order to disprove the theory of innate ideas Locke tried to establish the fact that man can possess all undeniable knowledge by the application of his normal natural powers that no innate ideas are required to assist this process. All experience is gained through the senses. Locke presents the following arguments against the theory of innate ideas:

1. Why do children and mad people have no experience of innate ideas – In disproving the existence of innate ideas that are universal in character, Locke has objected that if any truth is impressed upon the soul, then the soul should be aware of it. Putting it differently, it cannot be claimed that the soul can remain unaware of any truths that have been impressed upon it or have been part of it since its creation. Hence, if the soul does possess some innate ideas then children and madmen should also be aware of them, but they are not.

2. Innate ideas should precede all experience and intellectual development – If there are some innate ideas, by implication, they should be prior to any acquired knowledge. On the other hand, it has been seen that ideas that are said to be innate normally follow or come after considerable knowledge which children possess. This knowledge is gained by experience. Now if it is held knowledge of these innate ideas occurs when the mind has gone through certain development, it becomes even more difficult to prove their innate character. Another argument put forward to support the theory of innate ideas is that they are accepted as true and immutable the moment
one becomes conscious of them. This, too, cannot be accepted as strictly tenable for in experience knowledge will be equated with ideas that originate in experience and are acquired.

3. Space and time, relative ethical and religious concepts cannot be innate - Some people hold that ethical and moral or religious concepts are innate, and try to use them as examples in order to prove the theory of innate ideas. But Locke has demonstrated that in fact, no religious or ethical idea can be said to be universal. Religious and ethical concepts are influenced by time and space. Hence they cannot be used to prove the theory if innate ideas.

4. Innate ideas cannot be known in the absence of external influence – One argument put forward in support of the theory of innate ideas is that these ideas are destroyed and even destroyed by nature, education or other external influence. This argument can be objected to. It follows that whenever such external influences are absent these innate ideas should be known, that is, the individual should become aware of them. Children and in same individuals are not influenced by external and hence they should be the first to realize the presence of innate ideas but they do not do so. Having argued against the theory of innate ideas successfully Locke comes to the conclusion that this concept is baseless.

**Simple and Complex Ideas:** - To get a better grasp of what our knowledge is, how it comes about, and how far it reaches, we must carefully attend to one fact about our ideas, namely that some of them are simple, and some complex. The qualities that affect our senses are intimately united and blended in the things themselves, but it is obvious that the ideas they produce in the mind enter (via the senses) simple and unmixed. A single sense will often take in different ideas from one object at one time—as when a man sees motion and colour together, or the hand feels softness and warmth in a single piece of wax—and yet the simple ideas that are thus brought together in a single mind are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness a man feels in a piece of ice areas distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of alily, or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose. And nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas, each of which contains nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

These simple ideas, which are the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and supplied to the mind only by sensation and reflection. Once the understanding has been stocked with these
simple ideas, it is able to repeat, compare, and unite them, to an almost infinite variety, and so can make new complex ideas as it will. But no-one, however quick and clever, can invent one new simple idea that wasn’t taken in by one of those two ways. Nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there.

Knowledge according to Locke, agrees with the realities of things, as the simple ideas we get represent things outside. In this sense the simple ideas are the product of things operating on our minds. In other words, things outside us arose in us sensations that generate simple ideas. We are passive in their reception. This is a very fundamental assumption of Locke’s empiricism. He thus takes for granted the existence of things in the world, which had later attracted criticism from his own successors in the empiricist school. Locke thus assumes that there are things out there in the world and our simple ideas are copies of what is there in the world. Unlike these simple ideas, the complex ideas are not copies and they do not refer to anything original out there. The human mind makes them. Out of all the complex ideas formed by the mind the idea of substance is the most interesting and controversial one.

**Complex ideas** :- compounding, in forming ideas, the operation of mind is essential. Locke seemed to be too much occupied with the composition theory of complex ideas, though he saw its limitation. Once we have got the simple ideas through sensation and reflection we can compound them in infinite number of ways to get complex ideas. There is the unity of the complex ideas which is truly a mental contribution to the formation of complex ideas. Besides, compounding is possible with simple elements which we can get by decompounding. Hence decompounding is also admitted by Locke to complete his account of complex ideas.

Comparing:- it consist ‘in bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex together and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, with ought uniting them into one. This process at once gives rise to the apprehension of relations between terms compared.

Abstraction:- Locke rightly points out that all scientific knowledge is based on ideas which we gain through abstraction. In abstraction perform two processes.

1. The content to be generalized must be considered apart from its original setting.
2. The content so considered must be thought of as standing for or representing all other particulars of the same kind.

**Primary and Secondary Qualities**:- now the primary qualities are utterly inseparable from the material bodies, in all their different sizes and various changes. There are six such original or
primary qualities, namely, solidity, extention, figure, motion rest and number. They are constantly found in the bodies. The secondary qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objet themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. They include colour sound taste etc.

**George Berkeley (1685-1753)** pushes ahead with the argument of empiricism and demolishes Locke’s acceptance of the belief held by Descartes that physical substances exist. We can never have sensory experiences of material substances, says Berkeley. We can experience only sensory qualities. What is my actual experience of substance? It is only the experience of qualities. I perceive a tree as a certain size and shape, I perceive the diameter of its trunk, the length of its branches, the brown colour of its trunk and branches, and the green colour of its leaves; I touch its rough textures and smell its woody aroma- but I can never perceive its substance itself. All that I have perceived of the tree are its qualities. I have no perception of a substance. The existence of physical substances, Berkeley concludes, is only in their being perceived. According to Berkeley, *esse est percipi*, the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived; a substance, in order to be real, must be perceived by the mind. So Locke’s unknown and unknowable substratum is a meaningless abstraction. A substance, so far as matter is concerned, is nothing but a cluster of sensations. Physical substances cannot be known to have any other existence than in the qualities we perceive. For Berkeleian empiricism matter -physical substance, the physical universe- do not exist. But he believed that mental substances exist, in the form of finite minds and also in the form of God as infinite mind. The laws of nature for Berkeley are only the regularities of our own perceptions or ideas. Berkeley assured us that with the help of God our perceptions are reliable and orderly and that we can therefore trust in the uniformity of experience and in the dependability of scientific laws. But Hume gleefully asks how does Berkeley know that mental substance exists? Under this attack we will see collapse the idea that there are mental substances

**Rejection of Abstract Ideas** Berkeley presents various arguments opposing materialism.

(1) Berkeley thinks that the conception of matter as really having only primary qualities, such as extension, shape, solidity, movement, is an impossible one; he questions whether it is possible
for us to conceive of a shape which is no colour whatsoever; the conception of matter required for materialism is impossible, for it involves matter devoid of all secondary qualities, which are types of qualities which it could not lack, and from which primary qualities cannot be separated. (2) Berkeley argues that it is a logical contradiction to talk of conceiving of a thing which exists unconceived, for to conceive of the possibility of something existing unconceived is necessarily to conceive of that thing. But this argument, although tempting, is fallacious. It is true that it is not possible for $A$ to be conceived of, and at the same time both exist and be a thing unconceived; but that does not mean that at some other time $A$ could not exist as an unconceived-of-$A$; thus there is nothing contradictory in $A$ existing unthought about. (3) Berkeley turns Locke's argument concerning the relativity of perceptions against Locke's materialism. Berkeley takes Locke to be arguing for the distinction between primary qualities (shape, size, motion, solidity) and secondary qualities (colour, taste, heat, sound, etc.) on the basis that those qualities, not really in objects as we perceive them to be, are those that vary with the disposition of the perceiver; such qualities are, as they are perceived, subjective or in the mind (Locke does not in fact argue that secondary qualities are therefore merely subjective) and result from the effect of the insensible particles on us. But Berkeley points out that if this argument proves that secondary qualities are ideas in the mind, the same argument proves that primary qualities are also only ideas in the mind, for these too vary with the observer. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that in either case we have shown the qualities to be subjective, for there is no reason to believe that for a kind of quality to be really in objects, or be attributed as a real objective property of objects, it must be invariant with all changes in the observer. Moreover, we would actually expect the real properties of things to vary with the observer; for example, size as we get closer to an object. (4) This argument concerns pain and heat. When we approach a fire closely the heat is felt as a pain in the mind; when we are at a further distance from the fire the heat is felt merely as warmth. We are not tempted to say that the heat felt as pain is in the fire; so we should also say the same for the lesser degrees of heat felt as warmth, that heat is an idea in the mind. (5) In this Berkeley runs together the notion of matter with what Locke has to say about substance in general. He attributes to Locke an account of substance which he thinks unintelligible, and then takes this to be Locke's account of material substance or matter, so that is also unintelligible. Locke's discussion of substance in general seems to suggest that it is
characterized by being the "support" of all qualities; the qualities cannot subsist alone, so
substance is that in which the qualities subsist. But if substance is the support of all qualities
whatsoever, then any attempt to give it a positive characterization is impossible, since to do so
would be to attribute qualities to it; thus substance becomes an unknowable qualityless
"something". While this argument is perfectly flawless as an attack on a qualityless substratum,
it is wide of the mark as an attack on matter because no materialist would suggest that matter is
qualityless.

To be is to be Perceived: Berkeley makes a distinction between immediate and mediate
perception; respectively between the immediate sensations of the various senses, which involve
no inference and about which we cannot be mistaken, and that which is suggested by these
perceptions. The proper object s of perception are strictly speaking only those things we perceive
immediately, and all else that we claim to perceive is a construct or inference from immediate
perceptions. Thus Berkeley identifies the normal everyday objects or sensible things that we talk
about with ideas or bundles of ideas; but in making things into ideas he thinks he can show that
he has not made them any less real. Berkeley's idealism is opposed only to the philosopher's
conception of material substance as that in which sensible qualities that we perceive through the
mediation of ideas subsist when we do not perceive them. Berkeley concludes that the very
meaning of saying that sensible objects exist is that they are perceived-although at times he
suggests that an object's existence consists in its being perceivable. Berkeley moves from the
commonsense belief that sensible things are simply what we perceive, to idealism which holds
that the existence or being of sensible things consists in their being perceived or at least
perceivable. In the end Berkeley holds to the view that to be or exist as a sensible object is to be
actually perceived, and not to the phenomenalist view that to be is to be perceived or
perceivable-to be perceivable is to exist as a mere permanent possibility of sensation. Thus, in
Berkeley, with respect to sensible things, esse est percipi: to be is to be perceived. This is not the
only meaning that can be given to existence, however: minds or spiritual substance, which have
ideas, also exist. To exist is thus also to perceive: esse est percipere: to be is to perceive or be a
perceiver. So in full we can say esse est aut percipi aut percipere: to be (exist) is either to be
perceived or to perceive. Spirits are not, like sensible things, constructed as phenomena out of
perceived collections of ideas; they are that substance in which ideas inhere.
**Subjective Idealism:** Common sense tells us that they are bundles of physical stuff and that our minds have become adapted, perhaps through a process like evolution, to knowing about and acting with respect to them. Idealism, on the contrary, is the view that what reality is like depends upon the way the mind works. There are many distinct versions of idealism in the history of philosophy, and we will consider three of the most important versions over three distinct installments: Berkeley’s subjective idealism, Kant’s transcendental idealism, and Hegel’s absolute idealism. This, then, will be part one of a three-part installment on idealism, and we will start with George Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Berkeley argues that we are not entitled to believe that matter exists, in which case the only things that do exist include minds, ideas, and God. Berkeley is putting forth a view that is sometimes called *subjective idealism*: subjective, because he claims that the only things that can be said to exist are ideas *when they are perceived*. Thus, my black dog exists only when I am currently in possession of the idea of my black dog. If I leave my dog behind when I walk to the store, she no longer exists, and so her existence is purely dependent upon a subject's perception of her.

**David Hume’s (1711-1776)** exciting new philosophic outlook combined the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley, who argued that knowledge comes only from sense perception, with the moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson, who argued that morality comes only from sentiment or feeling. Putting these two conceptions together, Hume began to move toward the shocking thought that our best knowledge, our scientific laws, are nothing but sense perceptions which our feelings lead us to believe. Therefore it is doubtful that we have any knowledge, we have only sense perceptions and feelings. Here in these thoughts of the young Hume was a radical, extreme scepticism, an extreme form of doubting the possibility that certainty in knowledge is attainable. Hume maintains the view common to other philosophers of his period that we are only ever immediately acquainted with the contents of our mind: perceptions. He divides perceptions in the mind into *impressions* and *ideas*. These are to be distinguished not by their origin, but by their degree of force and liveliness; impressions are lively perceptions or experiences and ideas less lively. Impressions are the primary or first appearance in the mind of any mental content, ideas are secondary and derivative weaker copies of impressions. Roughly the distinction is between actually experiencing X, and thinking about X. Fundamental to Hume’s philosophy is that ideas, which are, generally speaking, the materials of thought, are faint copies of impressions and that we cannot have a *simple* idea of which we have not had a simple impression. Every simple idea...
has a corresponding simple impression that resembles it, and every simple impression a corresponding idea; that is, every simple perception appears both as impression and idea. This account has the odd consequence that to think about X (say, a pain) is mildly to experience X (a pain), which is surely false. We can have complex ideas of which we have no corresponding complex impressions, but only if they are made up of simple ideas copied from simple impressions we have had. The reason for this view is that Hume wishes to identify the correct impressions from which we derive ideas. There are two possible sources of ideas: impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation are basically sense-experiences; impressions of reflection are often new impressions which derive from the natural way we react to certain impressions of sensation. If we have an idea which is derived from an impression of reflection in this way, then the existence and nature of the resultant idea partly depend on the workings and nature of our mind, and the idea is not something derived wholly passively from experience of the world. The question is whether we are then justified in regarding the resultant idea as corresponding to a real feature of the world, or whether the idea does not correspond to a real feature of the world since it is simply a product of the way we react naturally to certain impressions of sensation, which in themselves do not contain that idea. For example we find that the idea of evil and evil acts is not derived from anything observed purely in acts, but results from the impression of reflection, abhorrence, we naturally feel, because of the reaction of human nature, at seeing certain acts; that we then regard evil as really in the world, and certain acts as abhorrent, results from the idea of evil being projected onto certain acts in the world, although it is not derived from something observed passively as really being in the world. If we did not react in certain natural ways to produce these impressions of reflection we would not, from observing the world, find any passive.

Kant Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is the most influential thinker because he gave a new direction to modern philosophy and of European Enlightenment. Kant have made great stir in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, morality and aesthetics. Today philosophers may disagree with Kant on many points, but no one can ignore him. By and large, contemporary philosophers, whatever their disagreements with Kant might be, would tend to accept his understanding of the role of metaphysics. In Kant’s time, as in the days of Greek philosophy, the term metaphysics referred to the inquiry concerning the nature of ultimate reality. Kant’s Copernican revolution,
however, resulted in the internalisation of these questions and showed that questions of metaphysics and epistemology are interrelated. In his writing Kant had not merely a theoretical purpose but also a practical impulse. Philosophy was to answer the problems of our intellect and the demands of our moral nature.

**Synthetic A priori**

There are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge completely independent of the senses (*a priori* knowledge) and knowledge wholly empirical (*a posteriori* knowledge). In defining *a priori* knowledge, Kant stresses its utter and complete independence from experience. The best example of completely *a priori* knowledge, Kant thinks, is found in mathematics, for in mathematics the concepts used are not derived from experience in any way but are generated entirely by the human mind. Sometimes Kant refers to that which is *a priori* as “pure,” meaning by that term simply that it has no admixture of the senses. For example ‘A senator is a member of the Senate’. *A posteriori* knowledge, or empirical knowledge as Kant usually calls it, is derived from our sense experience. For example ‘The Senator is corrupt’. There is really nothing much new in the distinction between *a priori* and *posteriori* knowledge; it is similar to Hume’s distinction between “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas”. But Kant takes this distinction one step further in relating it to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. In synthetic judgement predicate adds something and is not contained in the subject. In analytic judgement predicate adds nothing and is contained in the subject. *Posteriori* statements are synthetic and *a priori* statements are analytic. It is clear that a statement cannot be both a *posteriori* and *analytic*, since *a posteriori* refers to that which is derived from the senses, and analytic means that which is independent of the senses- a manifest contradiction. There is, however, one class of judgment left-judgments that are both synthetic and *a priori*. Are there any such judgments or concepts? Kant answers that not only are there concepts which are both synthetic and *a priori* (we find many of them in natural science and mathematics, Kant argues), but that they are the important ingredient in knowledge that the empiricists overlooked. **Synthetic *apriori*** knowledge would be that ideal knowledge, knowledge both certain and informative. Kant offers to the most important *synthetic *a priori* concepts involved in the process of achieving knowledge as categories and he is convinced that there are just twelve such concepts. The most important one in the light of Hume’s attack was the principle of causality. Hume was correct in thinking that causality is not a principle we can derive from experience, but he was wrong in
thinking that there is no legitimacy to this concept. Kant argues that causality was one of the categories (i.e., *a synthetic a priori* concept) that we bring to experience and which makes experience possible. In an extended and detailed argument, Kant argues that without such categories as cause and effect, substance, and others, there would be no way of transforming sensuous intuition (Kant’s term for sensations) into judgments which can be dignified by the term knowledge. We need the data supplied by the senses if we are to have knowledge, but these data need to be processed by the concepts (such as cause and effect) that the mind supplies out of its own operations. Both sensing and thinking are important. Without either, knowledge is impossible. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”.

**Phenomenon and noumenon**

Kant uses the concept of ‘limit’ in two separate but related contexts. On the one hand, knowledge vis-à-vis faith has to be restricted and on the other hand, given the peculiar ontological distinction that Kant makes between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*, it is necessary to restrict *phenomenon* (i.e. sensible intuition) from being extended to *noumenon* (i.e. *thing in itself*). The concept of phenomenon constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. In Kant’s analysis human cognition is confined to the extent a thing can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the categories. But human cognition can never penetrate into the *noumenon* and the thing-it-itself because they cannot be recognized by sensible intuitions. Kant thus prepares a border of cognition between what is cognizable in principle and what is incognizable. On the basis of what is cognizable in principle and what is incognizable, the epistemological problems in Kant arise. He expresses those problems in terms of possibility, validity and limit of human cognition. To understand the Kantian conception of ‘limit’, one needs to examine Kant’s separation between *noumenon* and *phenomenon* on the basis of threefold distinction between ‘reason’, ‘understanding’ and ‘sensibility. Sensibility, says Kant, is the faculty of intuition and understanding is the faculty of concepts. Through intuitions objects are given, through concepts they are thought. Sensibility furnishes the manifold materials, which are absolutely chaotic and unintelligible, while understanding gives them a unifying form and renders them intelligible. Therefore, in Kant’s epistemology, sensibility and understanding are the two factors, which constitute knowledge. Kant says, “All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the
highest unity of thought.” The understanding throughout the use of nify the concepts and judgments of understanding. Whereas understanding is directly related to sensibility, reason relates itself to sensibility only indirectly through understanding. Whereas sensation or sense-perception represents things only as they appear to us, reason-by means of rational-discursive apperception-provides us with insight into the real structure and essence of things. Kant realizes that our knowledge cannot be limited to mere empirical knowledge, for there are certain ordering principles presupposed by this very knowledge. These principles are known by reason. We learn by experience, for example, that fire causes heat-reason does not tell us this. But we do not learn by experience that every event has a cause. Rather we know it because the particular experiences we do have would be incoherent without it. So we may postulate rational knowledge in addition to empirical knowledge.

Kant’s analysis of epistemology is based on his concepts of space and time, and the categories which constitute the sources of human cognition. Human cognition, according to him, is *synthetic a priori*. The concepts and categories are “Original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself *a priori*”. In Kant’s *Transcendental Aesthetic*, “there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principle of *a priori* knowledge, namely space and time”. Space and time, the basic source of the unity of experience, derive from mind, not from the perceptual world. For Kant, though the thing in itself exists independent of the mind, space and time are mind dependent and cannot be applied to thing in itself. Space and time are logically prior to sensible intuition through which a material object is given to us. Time and space are not absolute because they are mind dependent and cannot be derived from sensible intuition, but every sensible intuition has to be posited and ordered in *a priori* forms of space and time. The sensible intuitions, synthesized in the forms of space and time, become the object of knowledge for Kant. Without space and time no objects would be perceived, and therefore space and time are precondition of our experiencing anything. Space and time are empirically real and transcendently ideal. They are empirically real because they are universally present in our experience; they are transcendently ideal because they do not arise from experience but are a product of the mind. Kant used the word *aesthetic* in its original Greek sense of having to do with the senses. All that has to do with the senses is in space and time.

Just as space and time are invariable categories of perception, there are also invariable categories of thought that set the mould in which we must think. These categories of thought are
examined in the *Transcendental Analytic*, what Kant calls understanding. The transcendental aesthetic provides man with the structure with which to perceive sense objects, and the transcendental analytic provides him with the structure with which to think about the world of experience. Human cognition/synthetic a priori is possible through the transcendental unity of apperception, which perceives all things and events in space and time, comprehend them under the categories of quantity, quality, substantiality, causality, reciprocity etc. These pure concepts (categories) of the understanding Kant considers to be a priori, independent of experience, universal: they form the structure of any mind, of any consciousness and necessary: they are a necessary condition of experience; without them, there is no knowledge, there is not even any experience. Categories are not structures of reality; they are only structures of our consciousness, our minds. They are significant only epistemologically, that is, in relation to our knowing: they have no significance metaphysically, or ontologically, that is, in relation to reality. And so we can know that the laws of nature will continue to hold true, because the universal and necessary concepts of our own minds structure them.

Categories of understanding can be applied to phenomena. It cannot be applied to things-in-themselves, because the latter can never be given in sensible intuition. If they are applied to the thing-in-itself, they lose their validity. Kant concluded that the mind is constitutive of phenomena, the world of experience. Kant confines understanding to the sphere of phenomenon and the knowledge which it provides is the knowledge of what he calls the conditioned. Kant’s *Transcendental Dialectic* has to do with the activity of the mind directed at getting beyond experience and seeking to know ultimate reality or things in themselves. As different from understanding, reason in Kant’s opinion, has no immediate relation to objects. But reason fails to present the unconditioned in reality; because whatever can be presented in reality is always conditioned. Therefore, the unconditioned is regarded by Kant as an idea of reason, for which there is no experimental basis. There are three ideas of reason namely freedom of will, immortality of soul and existence of God. The ideas of reason are transcendent and a-logical. For Kant the ideas of reason are regulative than constitutive. They do not constitute knowledge but merely regulate it. On this basis there arises a conflict between idea and reality and this conflict is what gives rise to the antinomies of pure reason where Kant uses his dialectics as a method of exposing transcendental illusions and claims to curb what he regards as the dogmatic pretensions of reason by preventing it from presenting the unconditioned in reality. Now, given the
conception of knowledge as *synthetic apriori*, it has a ‘limit’, i.e. it is limited to the *phenomenal* world and cannot penetrate into the *noumenal* world, i.e. into the ideas of reason, the realm of spiritual wherein lies the basis of Kant’s moral laws. Thus, the conception of limit as an epistemic category serves to maintain the distinction, as rigorously as possible, between the two realms, i.e. the *noumenal* and the *phenomenal*. Kant’s theory is a theory of limit in this sense. Kant assumes the existence of things-in-themselves on the basis that when appearances are given through the manifold of sensible intuitions, then there must exist something as the ground of appearances. Thing in itself is the ground and the cause of the appearances which affect our senses and thereby furnish the material element in our cognition. The sphere of the phenomenon is the possibility, validity and limits of scientific knowledge. Kant is of the view that we cannot transcend our experience or have *a priori* knowledge of the super sensible, of things in themselves, of things as they are apart from the way they affect us. Knowledge involves perception but things in themselves cannot be perceived by the senses. In sense perception, we know only the way things appear to consciousness, not what they are in themselves. So in his epistemology, Kant has limited human cognition to the world of phenomena by giving room for faith. He regards the sphere of faith, where scientific knowledge cannot penetrate, as the sphere of *noumenon*. Thing in itself is “an object of our sensible intuition”, while *noumenon* is not which presuppose a special mode of intuition namely “intellectual intuition.” Man can never comprehend the *noumenon* because the intellectual intuition, which comprehends *noumenon*, is of a special kind, which he can never possess. The concept of intellectual intuition is based on Kant’s assumption that, “...we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition”. Therefore, there must be an intellectual intuition in which *noumenon* can be given. Thing-in-itself can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding cannot be applied to them. Therefore, things in themselves, things as they are independent of our concepts, remain unknown and unknowable.

*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)* was born in Stuttgart, the son of a minor civil servant with a Lutheran background. He was educated at the University of Tiibingen, studying philosophy and theology. There he met the poet Holderlin and the philosopher Schelling. The French Revolution, which occurred during his time at university, made a deep impression on Hegel; he thought it was momentous in its rigorous application of reason, but it was also a great
failure because reason was applied in an abstract way that took no account of particular circumstances of the community.

**Dialectic Method:**- both Plato and Aristotle tried to explain the world of change through eternal Ideas. Following the idealistic lead and Aristotle, Hegel also regards the absolute as eternal and changeless. Nonetheless the absolute is system in which all changes are hushed and silenced in the eternal symphony of the absolute. Hegel does recognize that the world contains many changes and these changes are neither chaotic nor accidental. They all are logically guided and are regulated by the dialectic advances of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Before Hegel, the idealistic world of Spinoza was just static. Dialectical method has to be interpreted as a philosophical method to explain a dynamic and evolving world. The dialectical method tries to explain this world of change and evolution in terms of unchangeable Ideas. Hegel would explain the logical transition from the abstract to the concrete, from the more general to the less general idea. The nerve of the dialectic process is that logical unfoldment can be read off from empirical events, but the dialectic steps do not become empirical on that account. Empirical events are merely illustrative guide of the dialectic advance. The significance of this observation will become clear in the light of the critical appraisal of the Dialectical Method.

To understand the Dialectic Method we have to reflect upon the first triad of Being-Non-Being- Becoming. We have already said that the dialectic advance traces logical transition form the abstract to the concrete. Being is most abstract: it is abstract form all determinations, beyond being itself it has no other qualities. In comparison with Being, Becoming is more concrete sense it includes both Being and non-being within itself.

Karl Marx : Marx, on the contrary, employed dialectics materialistically. He created dialectic materialism. Materialist dialectics is the general movement and development caused by the conflict of contradictions that takes place throughout the universe both in nature and in society, and which is reflected in human thought. Dialectic materialism is the philosophy and method of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, an instrument for the study and transformation of everything that exists. Dialectic materialism is not confined merely to theoretical study: it involves practical revolutionary action. Dialectic thought strives to achieve a complete and all- embracing conception of phenomena. Every expressed opinion is more or less one- sided.

The principal features of the Marxist dialectical method are as follows:
a) Nature Connected and Determined: Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena.

b) Nature is a State of Continuous Motion and Change

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away. The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being. The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear to be not durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing.

c) Natural Quantitative Change Leads to Qualitative Change

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open' fundamental changes' to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes. The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of
what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher:

d) Contradictions Inherent in Nature

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes. The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a "struggle" of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions. It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

Class Struggle:- The central thrust of our interpretation of Marxian theory is to see accumulation as the expanded reproduction of a fabric of capitalist control that is always tenuous and repeatedly threatened by working class struggle. Crisis is thus, most basically, the rupture of that fabric and a positive consequence of the development of the working class as subject. Within this framework, revolution is to be understood as a “working class produced” crisis to which capital is unable to find an adequate response. This is not to deny that there are many-influences within the complex pattern of accumulation that are only indirectly related to workers’ struggles. We discuss many of these. We also recognize that struggle takes place in a concrete setting, at a given level of capital’s development and within a particular class composition that shape the direction and outcome of struggle. But it is our contention, that from the viewpoint of the working class, every factor related to crisis must be evaluated in terms of the development of sufficient power to overthrow the system.
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